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THE IMIA ISLETS: A BEGINNING TO THE 
MARITIME DELIMITATION  
OF THE AEGEAN SEA DISPUTE 
Emily A. Georgiades, Barrister∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey have each 
been vying for territory within their common waters in the Aegean Sea.  
For over five decades, the two governments have contested the territorial 
sovereignty of the two rocky islets of Imia, the delimitation of the 
continental shelf and the territorial sea, and whether the continental shelf 
is a natural prolongation of Greece or Turkey’s mainland coast.1  Not 
surprisingly then, the two countries have disagreed on where to draw the 
respective border in the Aegean Sea2 and, perhaps more fundamentally, 
on the application of certain practices under international law.3  
The Aegean Sea is itself unique being 400 miles long and 200 miles 
wide, with thousands of islands scattered throughout it.4  Of particular 
importance are the Imia rocks and islets, which are scattered 
approximately 4 miles off Turkey’s west mainland coast, in the southeast 
                                            
 * Barrister-at-Law of the Honorable Society of Lincoln’s Inn, New York State 
licensed attorney, License at Law (Cyprus), M.A. International Boundary Law 
(University of Durham), LL.M. (Fordham Law School), G.D.L. (The College of Law), 
B.A. (Fordham College). This Article is an adaptation of the research work Barrister 
Georgiades conducted at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Hamburg, 
Germany, during an attachment in 2006-2007.  Ms. Georgiades may be contacted at 
e.georgiades@hotmail.co.uk.  
 1. See infra Part III.   
 2. See id.   
 3. For example, Turkey remains a persistent objector to the extension of territorial 
waters up to twelve nautical miles.  See BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 47 (Alan J. 
Day ed., 2d ed. 1987).   
 4. Aegean Sea, COLUMBIA ELECTRONIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://print.infoplease.com/ 
ce6/world/A0802591.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2012). 
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Aegean Sea,5 and are also approximately 2.3 nautical miles from the 
Turkish island of Cavus.6  The islets are approximately 6 nautical miles 
east of the Greek island of Kalymnos, 1.9 miles southeast of the Greek 
island of Kalolimnos, and 1 mile west of the boundary that divides the 
Greek and Turkish territorial sea.7  Being so close to Greek and Turkish 
territories, the islands are at the center of the Greek-Turkish dispute. 
This Article will examine possible maritime and airspace 
delimitations through the application of international law, including 
customary law and bi- and multi-lateral conventions.  Part II begins with 
a brief discussion of the historical background that has shaped Greek-
Turkish relations and led to the present-day dispute.  Part III analyzes 
whether Turkey is bound by the provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, and Part IV proposes delimitations of 
the maritime zones, while specifically discussing the Imia islets and 
whether they are juridical islands capable of generating any maritime 
zones.  Part V provides possible territorial sea delimitations to the entire 
Aegean Sea, while Part VI discusses the relation between the territorial 
sea regime and the airspace above it.  Lastly, Part VII outlines methods 
to delimit the continental shelf and exclusive economic zone areas in the 
entire Aegean Sea before concluding with a discussion on various 
dispute resolution methods that Greece and Turkey may consider to 
resolve their long-standing issues in the Aegean.  
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CURRENT CLAIMS 
Although the dispute concerning the Aegean Sea stems largely from 
Greece’s acquisition of the territory in the first half of the twentieth 
century,8 the dispute is rooted in a deep history of political incidents that 
have added to the tension between Greece and Turkey.  
                                            
 5. Krateros Ioannon, A Tale of Two Islets: The Imia Incident Between Greece and 
Turkey, 1 THESIS 33, 35 (1997), available at http://www.hri.org/MFA/thesis/spring97/ 
two_islets.html.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. The modern Greek state’s acquisition of Aegean territory occurred in two phases: 
The first taking place after World War I, with the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, 
after which Greece claimed sovereign rights to the Imia islets.  BORDER AND TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES, supra note 3, at 45.  The second occurred after World War II, when Greece 
acquired the Dodecanese Islands from Italy through the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty.  
Id.   
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Turkey has frequently challenged Greece’s territorial claims in the 
Aegean Sea.  For example, in 1931, Turkey de facto9 questioned 
Greece’s ten nautical mile airspace for the first time.10  Although 
Turkey’s official maps began to depict the Imia islets as Greek territory 
in the 1960s, in 1964 Turkey unilaterally denounced the 1930 
Convention of the Establishment of Commerce and Navigation, an 
agreement devised by then-Turkish President Kemal Ataturk and then-
Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos.11  During 1973 and 1974, 
Turkey de facto questioned Greece’s sovereign rights over the Aegean 
continental shelf when the Turkish government granted research licenses 
to the Turkish state petroleum company and sent the research vessel 
Cardali to conduct research in the area.12  In 1974, Turkey again de facto 
questioned Greece’s ten nautical mile airspace.13  Tensions continued to 
rise when Turkey claimed that if Greece extended its territorial waters to 
twelve nautical miles, then Turkey would consider such an action a casus 
belli.14   
It was not until 1976 that Turkey and Greece agreed to refer the 
continental shelf dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), after 
which the dispute became known as the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
case.15  However, Turkey did not attend the hearing and did not submit a 
counter-memorial, claiming that both parties were still in the negotiating 
stage.16  The ICJ examined whether it had jurisdiction to hear the case 
and concluded that it did not have jurisdiction with respect to the 
                                            
 9. In the legal context, de facto means “having effect even though not formally or 
legally recognized.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (2d ed. 2001).  
 10. Greece has fixed the lateral limits of its territorial waters in two different ways: a 
six-mile territorial sea, for general purposes, and a ten-mile territorial sea, established by 
decree in 1931 for aviation and air-policing purposes.  Greece's Positions on National 
Airspace and Territorial Waters, EMBASSY OF GREECE (Jan. 18, 2012), 
http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=45&art
icle=80.   
 11. GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED 
RIVALRIES 129 (2007).  
 12. Chronology of Main Turkish Hostile Actions and Arbitrary Claims Against 
Greece 1955-1996, HELLENIC RES. NETWORK, http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/ 
turchro.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2012).    
 13. U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS & THE LAW OF THE SEA OFFICE FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA, THE RIGHT OF 
INNOCENT PASSAGE AND THE CONTIGUOUS ZONE, at 142, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V7 (1995).  
 14. Cansu Camlibel, Solve It or See You in Court, Greece Says, TURKISH DAILY 
NEWS, Mar. 27, 2011, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=either-a-solution-or-
the-court-greece-urges-turkey-on-aegean-2011-03-26. 
 15. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Aug. 10). 
 16. Id. at 8, ¶ 14.  
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delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea between Greece 
and Turkey because: (1) the parties did not agree as to the method of 
dispute resolution; and (2) when Turkey acceded to the General Act of 
1928, it included a reservation stating that the disputes relating to 
Greece’s territorial status, among other things, will be excluded from the 
procedures of the General Act.17  The reservation also stated that any 
disputes relating to international law issues would be solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of the states.18  The ICJ did, however, find that a 
boundary delimitation dispute of the Aegean Sea continental shelf 
exists,19  thus validating the that fact both parties have legal claims which 
need to be resolved either through negotiations or adjudication.  
Today, Greece and Turkey are asserting legal claims to the Aegean 
Sea.  Both nations are contesting the breadth of the delimitation of their 
respective maritime zones and airspaces in the Aegean Sea and both are 
claiming ownership of the Imia islets.  These claims are interrelated; 
determining ownership of the Imia may impact the extent of their borders 
in the Aegean Sea.  
III.  CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW V. TREATY ACCESSION: IS 
TURKEY BOUND?  
The first issue in addressing the validity of each party’s claim is 
determining the applicable international law.  Although there are various 
principles of international law that guide boundary delimitation cases, the 
most accepted doctrine is codified in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention).  However, while 
Greece has ratified UNCLOS, Turkey is not a signatory party and 
opposes the Convention; therefore, the Convention itself is not binding 
upon the parties.20  Accordingly, the issue becomes whether the 
principles adopted in the Convention have achieved customary status 
under international law and can therefore be considered erga omnes in 
nature.   
Customary law consists of customs that are accepted as legal 
requirements or obligatory rules of conduct.21  Determining whether a 
                                            
 17. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), Jurisdiction of the Court, 1978 
I.C.J. 46, ¶ 109 (Dec. 19).  
 18. Id. at 23, ¶ 55. 
 19. Id. at 23, ¶ 31; Id. at 46-49 (separate opinion of Vice President Nagendra Singh). 
 20. Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS 
Property Law (and What Is to Be Done About It), 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 241, 246 n.19 
(2007).  
 21. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 169 (2d ed. 2001). 
2011] The Imia Islets 107 
 
certain practice has attained customary international law status is 
difficult because “[p]roof of customary law, like proof of title to 
territory, is relative, not absolute.”22  While there is no single feature that 
is dispositive on such an analysis, generally, for principles to be 
established as customary international law, they must be established “by 
virtue of a pattern of claim, absence of protest by states particularly 
interested in the matter at hand and acquiescence by other states.”23  In 
addition, judicial decisions and state legislative acts are other ways of 
achieving the status of customary international law.24  Treaties also are 
capable of contributing to the formation of a customary rule because they 
are manifestations of the conduct of states; as such, they contribute to 
opinio juris.25   The utilization of rules and practices by international 
bodies, such as the ICJ, further supports a claim that such rules have 
become customary under international law.26   
UNCLOS merely codified rules that were already in practice.27  The 
fact that 162 states ratified UNCLOS28 signifies a general accord for its 
rules and principles.  Moreover, the preamble of UNCLOS states in part 
that its goal is to “develop the principles embodied in Resolution 2749 
(XXV) of 17 December 1970 and that it is believed that this Convention 
achieves ‘the codification and progressive development of the law of the 
sea.”’29  Thus, it is submitted that these rules are customary international 
law codified under UNCLOS.   
However, because Turkey has opposed the Convention, another issue 
that is raised is whether a state can prevent the formation of customary 
law.  In the South West Africa cases, Judge Tanka stated “that a few 
dissenting States could not prevent the formation of a customary 
international rule, but this implies nonetheless that a very large majority 
                                            
 22. THE CHALLENGE OF CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL LAW RESPONDS 427 (Ustinia 
Dolgopol & Judith Gail Gardam, eds., 2006).  
 23. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 84 (2003). 
 24. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 94 (2002).  
 25. Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary 
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L., 757, 758 (2001).   
 26. Id. at 775.  
 27. See SHAW, supra note 23, at 491-92.  
 28. U.N. Div. for Ocean Affairs & the Law of the Sea, Chronological Lists of 
Ratifications of, Accession and Successions to the Convention and the Related Agreements as 
at 03 June 2011, UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_ 
lists_of_ratifications.htm#The%20United%20Nations%20Convention%20on%20the%20Law
%20of%20the%20Sea (last updated June 3, 2011).  
 29. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
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is required.”30  Similarly, Professor Akehurst asserts that “[t]he number 
of States needed to create a rule of customary law varies according to the 
amount of practice which conflicts with the rule.”31  Article 38(1)(b) of 
the International Court’s Statute, which refers to customary international 
law as being established by state practice and opinio juris, speaks of a 
general practice and not of a universal practice.32 Therefore, if a few 
states dissent to a particular practice then that practice may still become 
customary international law because it is a general practice—not all 
states have to accept the practice.33  Turkey’s dissenting to Greece’s 
practices does not mean that the practices have not gained customary 
international law; rather, these practices are customary international law 
because they are practiced generally by a majority of states.  
A similar issue also arises out of Turkey’s non-acquiescence to 
UNCLOS: can a state be bound by customary international law if the 
state does not prescribe to it?  According to Professor Akehurst, “[a] 
State can be bound by a rule of customary law even if it has never 
consented to that rule.”34  However, the caveat is that for the rule to be 
binding on a state, the state must not have objected to the rule ab initio;35 
by not objecting at the first opportunity when an objection should be 
made, a state acquiesces.36  This first opportunity to object has great 
significance because it is the moment at which the state’s legal rights are 
either being preserved through objection or changed by silence.37  
According to Villiger, a state is not bound by a customary rule if it 
fulfills two conditions: (1) the state must have maintained its objections 
from early stages of the rule onwards, through its formation, and beyond; 
and (2) the objections must be maintained consistently.38  Notably, once 
                                            
 30. Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in SOURCES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (Marti Koskenniemi ed., 2000). 
 31. Id. at 268. 
 32. According to Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice: 
“[t]he Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a 
general practice accepted as law . . . .” Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 
38, para. 1. 
 33. See id. 
 34. Akehurst, supra note 30, at 273. 
 35. Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).  
 36. SHAW, supra note 23, at 437.  
 37. Id.  
 38. MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL 
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 34 (1997). 
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a rule of customary international law becomes binding on a state, the 
state cannot release itself from its obligations unilaterally.39   
In the present case, for approximately fifty years since the signing of 
the Paris Peace Treaty with Italy, Turkey has not protested the twelve 
nautical mile rule.  Although Turkey may have objected to the twelve 
nautical mile rule for territorial sea zones at the inception of the rule, it 
has not maintained its objection.  Evidence of this may be found in 
Turkey’s delimiting its territorial waters and continental shelf in the 
Black Sea with Bulgaria and other countries in accordance with 
UNCLOS principles.40  Turkey may argue that its agreement with 
Bulgaria was simply a negotiation or a political agreement; however, it is 
still an agreement that carries legal implications and is based on 
international legal norms.  Furthermore, there is no rule that conflicts 
with the twelve nautical mile rule for territorial sea delimitation.  Thus, 
Turkey is not exempt from UNCLOS.  
IV.  MARITIME TERRITORY: ANALYSIS AND DELIMITATION 
Having established that the principles expounded by UNCLOS are 
applicable in the Greek-Turkish dispute, the next step is to analyze the 
respective claims in the context of the maritime zones outlined in the 
Convention.   
The maritime zones include the territorial sea, the continental shelf, 
and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).41  The territorial sea is a zone of 
sovereignty and is the area of water that is closest to a state’s coastline.42  
It extends to a maximum breadth of twelve nautical miles.43  In turn, the 
continental shelf is comprised of the seabed and subsoil, beyond the 
territorial sea, that projects from the continental landmass into the sea 
and eventually falls away into the ocean’s depths.44  The continental 
shelf extends to the outer edge of the continental margin or to a 
                                            
 39. Id. at 261. 
 40. Turkey extended its territorial waters in the Black Sea to twelve nautical miles.  
Territorial Sea: Casus belli, HELLENIC REPUBLIC MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
http://www1.mfa.gr/en/issues-of-greek-turkish-relations/relevant-documents/territorial-
sea-casus-belli.html (last updated Mar. 3, 2011).  Turkey and Bulgaria delimited their 
maritime zones in the Black Sea by using the equidistance method of demarcation.  
NUGZAR DUNDUA, DELIMITATION OF MARITIME BOUNDARIES BETWEEN ADJACENT STATES 
30 (2006-2007). 
 41. UNCLOS, supra note 29, pts. II, IV, V.  
 42. Id. art. 3.  
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. art. 76(1).  
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maximum distance of 200 nautical miles.45  It is an area which is 
typically rich in oil and gas and abundant in fish.46  Lastly, the EEZ is the 
area beyond, and adjacent to, the territorial sea that provides the coastal 
state sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage its 
natural resources, as well as a right to conduct marine scientific 
research.47  Like the continental shelf, the EEZ begins from the outer 
limit of the territorial sea and has a maximum breadth of 200 nautical 
miles.48  Notably, islands that are naturally formed areas of land, 
surrounded by water, and above water at high tide, are capable of 
generating their own territorial seas.49   
Although there is no bright-line rule that delimits these zones—
because the facts of each dispute are different, each dispute requires 
case-by-case analysis—UNCLOS does provide guidelines.50  The 
Convention provides that principles of equity,51 proportionality,52 natural 
prolongation, 53 and non-encroachment,54 as well as the consideration of 
other relevant circumstances, including geographic size and location, be 
taken into consideration.55  
                                            
 45. Id. 
 46. SHAW, supra note 23, at 521. 
 47. UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 56.  
 48. Id. art. 57.  
 49. Id. art. 121.  
 50. Such guidelines are for drawing closing lines for the delimitation of internal 
waters of archipelagic states, id. art. 50, normal baselines, id. art. 5, straight baselines, id. 
art. 7, determining a combination of methods for drawing baselines, id. art. 14, delimiting 
the territorial sea between states, id. art. 15, delimiting the EEZ between opposite and 
adjacent states, id. art. 84, and delimiting the continental shelf between opposite and 
adjacent states, id. art. 86.   
 51. Tribunals and courts have used the principle of equity as a means of mitigating 
inequities between the parties.  SHAW, supra note 23, at 103.  
 52. “Proportionality” refers to the length of relevant coasts of each party; it is this 
ratio that can be used to apportion the size of each maritime zone.  See Fisheries Case 
(U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 18).  
 53. The term “natural prolongation” refers to the area of continental shelf which 
extends from a country’s land territory into and under the sea.  See Continental Shelf, 
1969 I.C.J. 3, 22 (Feb. 20).  It is an extension of a State’s landmass and provides the State 
with an inherent right to explore the seabed and exploit its natural resources.  Id.  
 54. The principle of non-encroachment is embodied in Article 7(6) of UNCLOS, 
which states that no state can use a system of straight baselines “in such a manner as to 
cut off the territorial sea of another state from the high seas or an exclusive economic 
zone.”  UNCLOS, supra note 29, art. 7.  
 55. In relation to the continental shelf, the Court determined in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, that 
delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, 
and taking account of all relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much 
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As a matter of law, there are several options available in delimiting a 
maritime boundary, including a continental shelf and EEZ boundary line 
of opposite and adjacent states. Accordingly, a delimitation of only the 
territorial sea around the Imia islets should be proposed for this area, 
while the continental shelf and EEZ delimitation can be done for the 
entire Aegean Sea region.  
A.  Possible Delimitation of the Maritme Zones of the Imia Islets 
The delimitation of the area between the Imia islets and the Turkish 
coastline should be done in light of applicable UNCLOS articles and 
relevant circumstances (e.g., proximity to the Turkish coastline and the 
neighboring island of Cavus, and the relative sizes of the coastlines and 
other neighboring islands).56 Accordingly: 
[N]either of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between 
them to the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the 
median line of every point which is equidistant from the nearest 
points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial 
seas of each of the two States is measured.57  
Thus, a median line is drawn midway between Cavus and Imia and 
between Imia and the Turkish mainland coast.   
In delimiting the area around the Imia islets, the principle of non-
encroachment should be considered because of the Imia’s close 
                                                                                                  
as possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a 
natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without 
encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of others.  
Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 54 (Feb. 20).  In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, 
the ICJ took into consideration Norway’s unique coastline that was deeply indented by 
fjords, sunds (sounds), and by a fringe of islands and rocks (the skaergaard) that are 
difficult to separate from the mainland.  Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 
(Dec. 18).  In the Tunisia/Libya case, the ICJ examined the role of proportionality and 
considered the disparity of the two states’ coastal lengths to adjust the median line and 
attribute a larger continental shelf to Libya.  Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1985 
I.C.J. 13, 48-50 (June 3).  In the Cameroon-Nigeria case, the ICJ had to take into 
consideration shifting populations, straddling villages, and boundary communities when 
deciding how to demarcate a boundary line.  See generally Land and Maritime Boundary 
Between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275 (Mar. 25).  Such 
considerations are important because the Court has to ensure that the rights and interests 
of the local populations are respected.  Id. at ¶ 107. 
 56. ROBIN ROLF CHURCHILL & ALAN VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 63 (3d 
ed. 1983). 
 57. Id.  
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proximity to Turkey and other islands.  On their eastern coasts, the Imia 
cannot have a continental shelf and an EEZ because these are areas that 
extend beyond the territorial sea.  However, it may be possible to have 
such zones on the southern and western coasts of the Imia in a manner 
which would not encroach upon the maritime zones generated by the 
islands of Kalymnos and Pserimos.  
Presently, there is a median line construction, but if sovereignty of 
the Imia were found to belong to Turkey, then the boundary line could 
possibly shift to the west.  The extent of this shift would depend on how 
much effect the islands were given.  If the median line construction is 
used, then it would be drawn between Kalymnos and the Imia (i.e., on 
the west side of the islands).  Alternatively, if half-effect is given, then 
the line could shift to the west in a manner that would cut less than the 
half-way distance between Imia and Kalymnos.  This latter option would, 
in effect, extend Turkey’s territorial sea by approximately 4-4.2 nautical 
miles west of the Turkish mainland coast.   
V.  DELIMITATING TERRITORIAL WATERS IN THE ENTIRE AEGEAN SEA 
REGION 
This section will discuss a possible delimitation of the entire Aegean 
Sea region, including, but not limited to, the Imia islets.  Because the 
territorial sea is the zone that begins from a nation’s coast it is logical to 
begin the delimitation with this zone and then to delimit the continental 
shelf and EEZ.  The two legal issues to be examined are: (1) the breadth 
of the territorial sea; and (2) the delimitation of the territorial sea.   
The first issue to consider when delimitating the territorial waters of 
the Aegean Sea is to what extent each state is allowed to extend its 
territorial seas in the Aegean.  Although, in theory, both Greece and 
Turkey have the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve nautical 
miles, in practice, this is not feasible due to the close proximity of the 
two nations.  If each nation extended its territorial waters up to ten 
nautical miles, access to the high seas via the northern Turkish coast and 
the Turkish straits would be cut off.  Therefore, the delimitation of their 
territorial seas must be seen in light of this special circumstance.  
Professor Van Dyke suggests a possible equitable compromise: 
accepting a twelve nautical mile territorial sea from Greece’s coasts, but 
not from its islands.58  Van Dyke also suggests another possible 
compromise: allow “at least some of Greece’s islands in the Western 
                                            
 58. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Aegean Sea Dispute: Options and Avenues, 20 MARINE 
POL’Y 397, 402 (1996). 
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Aegean to generate 12 nautical miles zones, while continuing to insist 
that the eastern Greek islands limit their territorial seas to 6 nautical 
miles.”59  Another proposed solution is based on the 1984 Agreement 
between Chile and Argentina, whereby Chile and Argentina “limited 
their territorial sea claims in relation to each other to three nautical miles, 
but claimed twelve nautical miles of territorial seas with regard to all 
other countries.”60  
1.  The Northern Aegean Sea Sector 
Because Turkey and Greece are adjacent states in the northern sector 
of the Aegean Sea, the territorial sea boundary line should be constructed 
perpendicular to the land frontier at approximately latitude 40° 43.5´ 
north, longitude 26° 00´ 2.5´´ east, and extend southwest at a distance 
halfway between Greece and Turkey and Samothraki Island.  Bolukbasi 
proposed drawing a mainland-to-mainland boundary line, which would 
not give any effect to Thasos or Samothraki except in allowing these 
islands to have a six nautical mile territorial sea zone.61  Likewise, he 
proposes discounting Bozcaada and Gokceada and not using them for 
base points.62  However, because of the relative size of these islands and 
the proximity of these Greek and Turkish islands to their respective 
mainland, it would be advisable to give them all full effect.  Given 
Samothraki’s size and relatively close distance to Greece and Turkey, 
this island should be given full effect; the perpendicular line should be 
drawn mid-way.  From this point, the boundary should extend south- 
southwest around Gokceada and south-southeast around the island of 
Limnos.  
2.  The Central Aegean Sea Sector 
In the central Aegean sector, Bolukbasi’s proposed model includes 
apportioning six nautical miles to the Northern Sporades and Skiros 
islands, and not giving them any effect in the median-line delimitation.63  
The Northern Sporades islands, along with Skianthos, Skopelos, and 
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Alonisos islands, are situated close to the Greek mainland coast.  
Therefore, these islands may be regarded as a continuation of the Greek 
mainland coast as much as Bozcaada and Gozceada are of Turkey’s 
mainland coast.  As such, they should be given full effect.  Also, Skiros 
is relatively close to Evvoia and should have full effect.  Lesvos Island is 
situated quite close to the Turkish mainland coast.  Therefore, Lesvos 
should have a median line delimitation with mainland Turkey on the 
eastern front, and a full twelve nautical mile territorial sea zone on the 
western front.  
3.  The South Aegean Sea Sector 
The south Aegean sector is harder to delimit because the Greek 
islands are numerous and scattered across the entire southern region.  In 
light of this, the best solution would be to maintain the status quo from 
Andros Island southward (i.e., allow only a six nautical mile territorial 
sea zone for all the islands) so as not to encroach upon the high seas and 
allow only Crete to extend the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles.  
This could be the best delimitation for both states because it would give 
each state the maximum amount of sovereignty within the confines of the 
Aegean Sea.  There is also the question of how much consideration to 
give to the islets and the surrounding islands.  There are three 
possibilities available: (1) give the islets partial or half effect (or “half 
angle”), (2) give the islets full effect, or (3) give the islets no effect.64  
Considering the modest size of the islets and their close proximity to the 
Turkish coastline, Kos and Kalymnos should have full effect.  The 
delimitation of Kastellorizo Island, also known as “Meghesti,” poses 
some problems with both nations because of its proximity to the Turkish 
coastline.65 Giving Kastellorizo full effect in the delimitation would 
result in cutting-off the high seas for Turkey on its southwestern 
coastline. 
4.  Alternative Solutions 
An alternative to delimiting the Aegean Sea area in three distinct 
sections (northern, central, and southern) is to divide the Aegean Sea in 
half, down the center, and then delimit the eastern islands and the 
western islands, respectively.  In this construction, straight baselines may 
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be employed to delimit the Cyclades and the islands extending southeast 
from Evvoia and Peloponissos because they are “a fringe of islands along 
the coast in [Greece’s] immediate vicinity.”66  All of these islands, except 
for Ikaria, Phragonisi, Dhenousa, Kinaros, Kalimnos, Antispalata, 
Andileousa, Tria Nisia, and Saria, may be given a twelve nautical mile 
territorial sea zone and the remaining islands may be given a six nautical 
mile territorial sea zone.  This would allow navigational passage into the 
Mediterranean Sea via a corridor of the high seas.  The equitableness of 
this proposed drawing may be assessed by using the proportionality test, 
which entails comparing the two states’ coastal ratios.   
If no island is given effect when the boundaries are drawn then there 
is a possibility of enclaving islands situated on the “wrong” side of the 
boundary line.  Bolukbasi argues that enclaving the Greek islands 
situated “on the wrong side of the median line” is the only equitable 
solution, as any other solution would prove grossly inequitable.67  
Conversely, Bowett argues that “the enclave solution, however equitable 
for an isolated group of islands on the wrong side of the median line, is 
inappropriate for a situation like the Aegean where the islands are so 
numerous and in fact dominate the whole sea area.”68  Given the history 
of the two states, the geographic location of the islands, and the current 
relationship between Greece and Turkey, it would be best not to enclave 
the Greek islands for practical and administrative purposes.  
In the interests of justice, a simpler approach is to begin with the 
demarcations presented on maps by both Greece and Turkey and to 
devise a boundary line that would satisfy both nations.  Such a solution 
would be political rather than legal because a government’s unilateral 
demarcation on the map does not hold legal weight without the 
corresponding physical control (“uti possidetis”) over the territory 
therein.69 
No matter which approach is taken, the result must balance both 
parties’ rights.  The following illustrates the factors that need to be 
balanced against either party’s right to extend its borders.  If Turkey 
increases its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles in the Aegean Sea, 
it would increase its current territorial waters by 1.27%, causing the 
boundary line to shift outwards.70  On the other hand, if Greece was to 
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exercise its right to extend its territorial sea limit to twelve nautical miles 
(from the present six), then Greece’s share of the Aegean Sea would 
increase by approximately twenty-six percent, causing the boundary line 
to shift outwards.71   Moreover, if the territorial seas surrounding the Imia 
islets were increased, then Turkey would become nautically semi-
enclosed on its western front and the only method of gaining access to 
the Mediterranean Sea from its western coast would be to obtain 
permission from Greece to cross Greek territorial waters.  Therefore, the 
territorial waters surrounding the islands that lie closely to Turkey’s 
western border should not be increased beyond the median line between 
their coasts and Turkey’s. 
Another effect of extending the territorial waters to twelve nautical 
miles would be a significant reduction of high seas—from 43.68% to 
19.71%.72  Turkey would be disadvantaged by not having access to the 
Aegean and Mediterranean Seas; the lack of access would curtail its 
trade with other countries and possibly lead to a decline in the Turkish 
economy and standard of living in general.  If this were the case, 
according to Article 17 of UNCLOS, Turkey would still have the right of 
innocent passage through Greece’s territorial sea.73  
 However, it is not possible to extend the territorial waters of the 
Imia on its eastern front beyond two nautical miles because there is 
approximately a four mile difference between the coast of the Imia and 
the Turkish mainland coast.  If this were done in negotiations, Turkey 
would become nautically semi-enclosed on its western front.  However, 
being semi-nautically enclosed does not mean that Turkey is completely 
disadvantaged because “the coastal state shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
. . . with regard to customs, fiscal, health, safety, immigration laws and 
regulations,”74 so that Greece would still have to abide by Turkey’s 
regulations on these matters even though Greece is very close to 
Turkey’s borders.   
The disadvantage of extending the territorial waters to twelve 
nautical miles is the creation of new straits for international navigation.  
According to Articles 34 and 45 of UNCLOS, military aircraft would be 
allowed to fly over these straits, which may pose a security issue for 
either or both states.75  In any event, Turkey has expressed the sentiment 
that if Greece were to extend its territorial waters to twelve nautical 
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miles, then Turkey would consider this casus belli because it would limit 
its access to the Mediterranean Sea.76 
A possible solution to this predicament is to have a separate 
agreement for the extension of the Flight Information Region (FIR) zone 
and for the territorial sea zone.77  For example, the status quo may be 
maintained for the overflight zone of ten miles,78 while the territorial sea 
may be extended to a maximum of ten nautical miles; or, alternatively, 
the status quo could be maintained in both the overflight zone and the 
current six nautical mile territorial sea zone.  Within this overflight zone, 
the coastal state has rights of sovereignty, as it would within the 
territorial sea; this sovereignty is provided for in Article 1 of UNCLOS.79 
In sum, the parties have to strike the right balance in devising their 
territorial sea borders to ensure that neither party is disadvantaged by an 
extension of the current territorial sea zone which closely corresponds to 
the airspace above it.   
VI.  THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TERRITORIAL  
SEA AND THE AIRSPACE ABOVE IT 
Generally, the borders of a country’s airspace mirror the land borders 
and territorial sea absent an agreement to the contrary.80  The borders of 
the airspace will also mirror the borders of the territorial sea, as the latter 
is also a zone of sovereignty and essentially an extension of the land of 
the coastal state.81  Presently, the territorial waters of Greece extend to 
six nautical miles, whereas the airspace over it extends to ten nautical 
miles.82  The question posed by this dispute is whether the airspace 
regime can be separate from the maritime regime—i.e., can an airspace 
boundary differ from the territorial sea boundary so that two different 
regimes exist?    
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FIR is an aviation term used to describe airspace with specific 
dimensions, in which a Flight Information Service and an Alerting 
Service are provided.83  Greece has the Athens FIR, which presently 
extends up to the maritime border with Turkey in the eastern Aegean 
Sea.84  The Athens FIR limits were determined during the Regional Air 
Navigation Meetings in Paris in 1952, and Geneva in 1958, based on the 
outer limits of Greece’s coastal zone and airspace.85  Aeronautical maps 
depicting this delimitation were communicated to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) in 1955 without third party objections.86  
Greece has a “coastal zone of 10 nautical miles serving aviation and air 
policing requirements as established by Presidential Decree 6/18 of 
September 1931 on the determination of the extent of territorial waters 
for aviation and air policing requirements.”87   
Turkey has respected and recognized this airspace limit for forty-four 
consecutive years prior to contesting it by “violating” the national 
airspace (i.e., Turkish fighter planes flying within the ten nautical mile to 
six nautical mile airspace).88  Moreover, Turkey has published 
aeronautical maps that recognize Greece’s ten nautical mile national 
airspace zone.89  However, Turkey has been attempting to unilaterally 
change the FIR zone since August 1974, when Turkey unilaterally issued 
a notice extending the Istanbul FIR beyond the Greco-Turkish maritime 
border in the eastern Aegean Sea.90 
Because Turkey did not protest in 1931, or shortly thereafter, it is 
arguable that Turkey acquiesced to this delimitation.  It may, therefore, 
be too late for Turkey to protest.  As a result, it may be that a special 
international custom has been created, but only a court or tribunal could 
determine this with certainty.  In the meantime, it is necessary to clarify 
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each state’s FIR zone so that neither state finds itself in breach of the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation (CICA).91   
If Greece extends its territorial waters in the Aegean, Turkey would 
lose the airspace over the affected seas and would have to request 
permission from the Greek government to fly in Greek national airspace.  
The converse would also be true if Turkey were to extend its territorial 
waters in the Aegean.  Similarly, the reduction of the high seas could 
lead to an equal reduction of international airspace.  It has been stated 
that “[g]eneral international practice as well as the IMO and ICAO 
recommendations contained in the International Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue Manual advocate the adoption of identical 
areas for both air and sea search and rescue, to coincide with the limits of 
the FIRs.”92 
According to the wording of Article 2 of UNCLOS, it would appear 
that the outer limits of the territorial sea are the defining factor of the 
outer limits of the airspace above.93  The same principle is reiterated in 
Articles 1 and 2 of CICA.94  Therefore, the present airspace should be 
approximately seven miles, and if and when Greece’s territorial sea limit 
is extended, the airspace should be extended to match this regime.  
VII.  THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES 
Part VI of UNCLOS, which deals with the continental shelf regime,95 
incorporates the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, which was 
crystallized in 1958.96 Although the 1958 Convention defines the 
characteristics that comprise the continental shelf, UNCLOS builds on 
that definition continental shelf by including the rights and duties of the 
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coastal state.97  Examples of such rights and duties include sovereign 
rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources,98 the 
right to construct installations after providing notice, and the duty to take 
appropriate measures in the safety zones for the conservation of natural 
resources.99  
Article 76(1) of UNCLOS defines the continental shelf as being 
comprised of 
the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond 
its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land 
territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a 
distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured . . . .100  
This definition may not be very helpful in this circumstance because the 
Aegean seabed appears to be a natural prolongation of the mainland 
coasts of both Greece and Turkey.  Therefore, it is useful to determine 
which coastal state owns which islands because juridical islands are 
entitled to a full suite of maritime zones.  
A.  The Continental Shelf 
The delimitation of the continental shelf covers the entire Aegean 
Sea area.  Article 83(1) of UNCLOS provides the guiding principle for 
delimiting the continental shelf, stating that “the delimitation of the 
continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law.”101 Special 
circumstances must be taken into consideration when delimiting this 
zone, including consideration of natural resources found within the 
seabed.102  
Turkey favors drawing the boundary line in the middle of the Aegean 
Sea, equidistant from either the main coastline, without giving effect to 
the Greek islands in the middle.103 Although Greece claims that the 
continental shelf extends from the Greek mainland coast continuously 
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past the Imia islets, the continental shelf may be considered a continuous 
natural prolongation of both Greece’s or Turkey’s mainland coast.  
However, Greece’s coastal ratio in relation to Turkey’s is approximately 
1.54:1 in favor of Greece, which means that Greece’s coast is 
approximately one and a half times larger than Turkey’s.104  Because the 
main tenet of the law of the sea is that “a State’s entitlement to maritime 
areas is measured by reference to its coastline,”105 it is arguable that 
Greece would be entitled to larger maritime areas in proportion to its 
coastline.  
B.  Delimitation of the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
In the 1979 Aegean Sea Case, the ICJ stated that the basic question 
in dispute was whether the islands under Greek sovereignty generate a 
continental shelf of their own, and whether those islands entitle Greece to 
draw a boundary between those islands and the Turkish coast.106  The 
issues were posed in the following two questions, which had to be 
answered successively: (1) Are the Greek islands entitled to a continental 
shelf? And, if so, (2) how should it be delimitated?107  The Aegean 
islands (whether Greek or Turkish), which are juridical and able to 
generate a continental shelf without encroaching on the maritime zones 
of the other party, should have a continental shelf zone delimited to 
allow the territorial sovereign to extract the oil and gas which may be 
found in the subsoil.  However, if the parties agree in negotiations to 
ignore the Aegean islands then the boundary line for this zone would 
begin from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured.108  
Once the boundaries for the territorial waters are devised, the 
continental shelf borders may be drawn, but it must be delimited in such 
a way so as not to encroach upon the maritime zones of one state to the 
detriment of another state, nor to block access to the high seas.109  The 
most appropriate method in this continental shelf delimitation would be 
to begin by drawing a provisional equidistant line without giving the 
islands any effect, then to adjust the line to give effect to those islands 
that should have effect, and then finally to readjust the line again to 
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account for high seas access.  For reasons of practicality, it would be 
helpful to devise the boundaries in the manner outlined above for the 
territorial seas—the northern, central, and southern Aegean sectors—and 
then meet the boundary lines before accounting for proportionality and 
equitableness.  
The continental shelf can be extended in the north Aegean Sea but 
not to a maximum 200 nautical miles because it would encroach upon the 
high seas.  The same may be done in the central Aegean sector if 
Skopelos Island and Psara and Anti-Psara Islands are given half-effect 
instead of full effect.  However, the central Aegean sector is narrower 
than the northern and southern sectors, which would result in a shorter 
continental shelf.  
C.  The Exclusive Economic Zone  
Article 57 of UNCLOS provides that the EEZ extends to a maximum 
breadth of 200 nautical miles “from the baselines from which the breadth 
of the territorial sea is measured.”110 Although these are rights that are 
prescribed to the coastal state, these rights are sovereign rights, which 
are a limited form of sovereignty.111 Moreover, “under the Convention 
there is no obligation on a State to claim an EEZ.  Nevertheless, coastal 
states have in fact exercised their right to make such a claim.”112  
Presently, Greece claims a fishery zone with a breadth of six nautical 
miles in the entire Aegean Sea region.113 
If Greece were to claim an EEZ, then it would have the option of 
drawing a boundary line following the guiding principles expressed in 
Article 74(1) of UNCLOS, which provides, in part, that the “delimitation 
. . . shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law . . . in 
order to achieve an equitable solution.”114  Taking into consideration 
equitable principles (such as the principle of non-encroachment), and the 
fact that the Imia islets will not have a 200 nautical mile continental shelf 
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due to its proximity to Turkey, a boundary line could be drawn midway 
between the Imia islets and the neighboring Turkish island of Cavus.115  
The same approach with the same principles can be used to delimit 
the EEZ as was used for the continental shelf.  Furthermore, both zones 
have a maximum 200 nautical mile limit and both are drawn from the 
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.116  
D.  Dispute Resolution Methods 
Boundary delimitation is a mutual activity done with the cooperation 
of the states involved.117  Greece and Turkey have been encouraged 
several times by other states to refer the matter to the ICJ.118  However, 
Turkey has not been very keen to take up this suggestion; instead, 
Turkey seems more inclined to resolve the dispute through unilateral 
negotiations with Greece.119 Turkey is seemingly unwilling to resort to 
the ICJ because: (1) the ICJ oscillates between legal positivism and 
judicial activism; (2) the ICJ has a timid attitude in contentious cases, 
which is a warning for Turkey that in the Aegean dispute the ICJ is likely 
to uphold the present rules of international law and judge in favor of 
Greece; (3) national bias influences the ad hoc voting behavior of judges; 
(4) Turkey is legally vulnerable; and (5) the consequences of a binding 
judgment would be irreversible.120   
Greece and Turkey have attempted to settle the dispute peacefully 
between themselves through negotiations and by resorting to the ICJ.121  
The two countries could also resort to dispute settlement methods such as 
mediation, inquiry and reconciliation, arbitration, or perhaps by eliciting 
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advisory opinions from other international institutions, such as the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).  Greece and 
Turkey also have the option of appealing to the United Nations Security 
Council.122  
However, of the two states, it is more likely that Turkey would 
choose to have the Security Council settle this dispute, given that Turkey 
agreed to settle disputes in accordance with Article 33 of the U.N. 
Charter in its boundary agreement with Bulgaria.123   Article 34 of the 
UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority (by virtue of the 
word “may”) to “investigate any dispute, or any situation which may lead 
to international friction . . . in order to determine whether the 
continuance of the dispute . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace.”124  As a practical matter, it is not likely that Greece 
would consider this recourse because the Security Council does not have 
the technical experts to delimit the area.  Therefore, the best option 
would be for the two states to attempt to settle their differences with the 
aid of a third party (e.g., a neutral international organization).  
As a result of the two countries’ past experience and expertise on law 
of the sea issues, the best venue for the solution of this dispute would be 
ITLOS.  ITLOS is favored by most as the first recourse for settlement of 
law of the sea disputes.125  Furthermore, if the case is brought before the 
ICJ, it is highly likely that the matter will not be heard for many months, 
given the number of cases waiting to be heard by the ICJ presently.  
Thus, it is more advantageous for any state to begin proceedings on law 
of the sea disputes in ITLOS, where it is far more likely that the case will 
be heard and dealt with expeditiously.  This efficiency will free other 
international bodies to deal with other matters.   
Although Turkey has not ratified UNCLOS, the dispute may still be 
brought before ITLOS.  ITLOS has jurisdiction to hear any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of UNCLOS, and over all 
matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers 
jurisdiction on ITLOS.126  ITLOS is open to state parties regardless of 
whether those states are signatory parties to UNCLOS.127 
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Turkey and Greece could then reach an agreement to request an 
advisory opinion from ITLOS.  This procedure is provided for under 
Article 138 of the Rules of ITLOS.128 They may request an advisory 
opinion on either the principles to use in delimiting the boundaries 
without actually delimiting, or on the types of provisional agreements 
that the two states could implement without prejudicing future boundary 
delimitations and without prejudice to their sovereign rights.  Although 
this advisory opinion would not be binding, it could very well be 
instrumental in progressing negotiations and hopefully solving the 
Aegean dispute.  Time is of the essence for both Greece and Turkey, and 
it is in the interests of both states to settle this dispute as soon as possible.    
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
Greece and Turkey are two ancient empires whose relationship has 
historically been plagued with tension culminating to the present 
maritime and airspace disputes in the Aegean Sea and more specifically 
to the sovereignty dispute over the Imia islets.    
While the Imia islets are relatively small islets and at first seem to be 
of no great importance, the issues which need to be negotiated in good 
faith between both parties have the potential to open the floodgates for 
disputing other claims within the same area over other territories.  
Furthermore, the Imia have strategic importance given that they are 
situated approximately four miles off the coast of Turkey and close to 
other Greek territory. 
This Article has provided several possibilities to demarcate the 
Aegean Sea maritime boundaries using customary international law 
principles, which both Greece and Turkey are subject to.  Such 
boundaries may be devised by either drawing the borders from the 
parties’ respective mainland coastlines and then adjusting the lines to 
account for the various islands; to enclaving the islands or dividing the 
Aegean Sea in three parts (northern, central, and southern) and 
demarcating each section separately before joining the final boundary 
lines. The complexity of boundary delimitation is appreciated once 
having considered the various principles (e.g., natural prolongation, non-
encroachment, etc.) and techniques (e.g., drawing median lines, 
accounting for coastal ratios and high seas, etc.) that may be employed in 
devising a boundary line.  The matter is more complex given that the 
entire Aegean Sea contains thousands of islands of various sizes and it 
must be determined whether or not they are juridical islands and whether 
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they should be considered in drawing the boundary lines.  The parties are 
free to continue ongoing negotiations in hopes of leading to a solution 
which is acceptable to both sides or they may refer their dispute to an 
international tribunal such as ITLOS for a binding decision.   
The analysis conducted in this Article is meant to be merely a 
starting point in the opening of a meaningful dialogue between the 
parties (and perhaps globally) over the numerous possibilities in 
boundary delimitation, whether it be for maritime zones, airspace, or 
land boundaries.  Every dispute is unique, and this one is no exception, 
but it is important to set firm land, sea, and air boundaries.  As the old 
adage declares: “good fences make good neighbors.” 
